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Abstract
This paper investigates the redistributive effects of taxation on occupa-
tional choice and growth. We discuss a twosector economy in the spirit
of Romer (1990). Agents engage in one of two alternative occupations:
either selfemployment in an intermediate goods sector characterized by
monopolistic competition, or employment as an ordinary worker in this
sector. Entrepreneurial prots are stochastic. The occupational choice un-
der risk endogenizes the number of rms in the intermediate goods indus-
try. While the presence of entrepreneurial risk results in a suboptimally
low number of rms and depresses growth, nonlinear tax schemes are
partly capable of compensating the negative by effects by ex post provid-
ing a social insurance.
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This paper investigates the effects of redistributive taxation on occupational
choice and longrun growth. The analysis combines the issue of occupational
choice under risk in the tradition of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Kanbur
(1979a,b, 1980) with modern approaches to endogenous growth à la Romer
(1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) in the framework of a macroecon-
omic overlapping generations model. The paper thus adopts the Knightian view
on the role of entrepreneurship (Knight, 1921), considering riskbearing to be
an essential task of entrepreneurs.
In the model suggested here, the longrun growth rate of the economy is
positively correlated with the population share of entrepreneurs. This reects
recent empirical observations by Audretsch and Thurik (2000), Audretsch et al.
(2002) as well as Carree et al. (2002), who nd for a cross section of 23 OECD
countries that entrepreneurship is a vital determinant for economic growth.
The agents engage in one of two alternative occupations: Either they set up
a rm in a market of monopolistic competition, which exposes them to a non
diversiable prot risk. Or they decide to be a worker in this sector, thereby
earning a safe wage income. Nonsurprisingly, the attitude towards risk turns
out to play central role for the extent of entrepreneurial risktaking, a nding
which is empirically supported by Cramer et al. (2002) and Ilmakunnas et al.
(1999).
We observe two counteracting forces. On the one hand, the prospect of
yielding monopoly prots provides an incentive to set up a rm. On the other
hand, risk averse agents are concerned with avoiding the income risks being
associated with selfemployment. The latter negative incentive effect prevails,
such that the market equilibrium is characterized by a suboptimally low number
of monopoly rms in the intermediate goods sector. This carries over to the
longrun growth rate of the economy, which is a function of the population
share of entrepreneurs. Hence, our approach also provides an explanation
for the empirically documented negative relationship between risk and growth
(Ramey and Ramey, 1995).
The riskiness of selfemployment is also expressed in high failure rates of
entrepreneurial ventures (cf. Quadrini, 1999). According to U. S. data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), rst year exit rates amount to 35%.
Heaton and Lucas (2000) point out that the incomes of entrepreneurs exhibit
a considerably higher volatility than wage incomes, although evidence on the
1return to private (entrepreneurial) equity relative to public equity hardly indi-
cates the presence of a positive risk premium; see also Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002). Germany experienced an ongoing growth in business fail-
ures throughout the last decade, in absolute numbers from about 11,000 in
1992 to 40,000 in 2004. Recent data from the German Bundesagentur für
Arbeit reveal that about one fth of the participants in the specic public pro-
gram subsidizing small startup enterprises (IchAG) left the market within
the rst two years.
If now the presence risk goes along with less entrepreneurial activity and
subsequently lowergrowth, a natural question to ask is to what extent an appro-
priately designed public taxtransferscheme might stimulate rm ownership,
if private markets for pooling individual risks are not available due to credit
market imperfections or moral hazard problems. These considerations draw
from an argument rst brought forward by Varian (1980), Eaton and Rosen
(1980) and Sinn (1996). The authors point out that redistributive taxation 
being effective ex post  acts as a social insurance, thereby providing incentives
to already increase risktaking from an ex ante point of view.
Carried over to the context discussed here, the argument suggests that an
increase in redistribution causes a rise in the number of agents choosing to
be an entrepreneur, hence ultimately promoting growth, although the ex ante
extent of income inequality becomes larger too. Our subsequent analysis makes
explicit the conditions under which this line of argument yields the desired
results and when it fails to do so.
The important role which entrepreneurial risk might play for longrun
growth has been of little interest, when we review the development of modern
growth theory throughout the last two decades. Authors like Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Aghion and Howitt (1992) emphasize the
Schumpeterian view on entrepreneurship. The contributions stress the inno-
vative potential of rm ownership by focusing on R&D efforts and associated
monopoly prots due to exclusive property rights. But even if innovations are
considered to follow random processes, those rms undertaking research are
usually assumed to be indifferent towards risk.
A notably exception is the contribution of Garcia Peñalosa and Wen (2004)
who, similar to Clemens (2004), establish a causality between individual in-
come risk, entrepreneurship, and growth. Garcia Peñalosa and Wen (2004)
focus on the riskiness of innovations in the R&D sector, yet, at the cost of not
2taking into account the intertemporal savings decision and the accumulation of
physical capital. Contrary, in our model, occupational choice affects the long
run growth rate of the economy via the equilibrium return to capital. This
enables us to derive more general results regarding the growth and welfare
effects of redistribution.
The paper is organizedas follows: the overlappinggenerations generalequi-
librium model is developed in the next section, which also characterizes optimal
individual behavior of households and rms in the intermediate as well as in
the nal goods sector. Section 3 introduces the nonlinear redistributive tax
transferscheme and also describes the equilibrium occupational choice under
risk. Section 4 determines the market equilibrium and the longrun growth
rate of the economy. We examine the growth and welfare effects of changes in
the amount of redistribution due to changes in the degree of tax progression.
2 The Model
Households We consider a discretetime overlapping generations economy in
the tradition of Samuelson (1958) or Diamond (1965). The identical house-
holds live for two periods. We normalize the population size of each cohort
to unity. There is no population growth. Each member of the young gener-
ation is endowed with one unit of labor, which she supplies inelastically. At
the beginning of their life, citizens choose between two alternative types of oc-
cupation. They can decide either to set up a rm and become a monopolistic
entrepreneur in the intermediate goods industry, or they become employed in
this sector. lt denotes the share of entrepreneurs within the generation which
is active in period t. The corresponding share of workers is given by 1 lt.
While employment is payed the riskless wage income w, selfemployment
yields risky prots pj per monopoly j. The risk stems from a idiosyncratic
technology shock. By the time the households choose between the occupations,
they do not know the realization of the shock.
By the time they compose their intertemporal consumption prole, the in-
come realization is known and the agents act under perfect foresight. We as-
sume the costs of switching between occupations to be prohibitively high, such
that the employment decision once made is irreversible. All individuals retire
after the rst period. When old, savings and interest payments are used to
nance retirement consumption. There are no bequests.
3The individuals spend their income on a single nal good, which can be
consumed or invested respectively. Lifetime utility of a member of a cohort i is











; r > 0 : (1)
The current period utility functions are characterized by constant relative risk
aversion, measured by the parameter r. For simplicity, the attitude towards
risk is assumed to be identical for all agents, although Kihlstrom and Laffont
(1979), Kanbur (1981), and Cramer et al. (2002) stress, that the entrepreneur-
ial occupation is more likely to be chosen by agents who are less risk averse.1
The agents discount future consumption, where the discount factor b satises
0 < b < 1.
Let yi;t denote the period t income of a member of generation i, where this
income is either wage income or prot income. Then, the intertemporal budget
constraint can be written as follows
ci;t = yi;t  si;t ;
ci;t+1 = si;tRt+1 :
(2)
Rt+1 is the gross rate of interest paid on savings held from period t to period
t +1.
Because we assumed the income realizations to be known by the time of
intertemporal choice, optimization is performed under certainty and yields the
familiar Euler condition
U0(ci;t) = bRt+1U0(ci;t+1): (3)
Given the functional form of utility (1), we arrive at the following savings
function






which implies that all period t households save the identical fraction f(Rt+1) of
the individual income earned, while being economically active.
Given optimal savings, (1) can be used to express maximized lifetime utility













1Incorporating heterogeneity with respect to the degree of risk aversion is a worthwhile ex-
tension of the model, but beyond the scope of this paper.
4Occupational choice is related to the labor market and intermediate goods mar-
ket equilibrium and will be discussed below.
Final goods sector The representative rm of the nal goods sector produces
a homogeneous good Qt using capital Kt and varieties of a differentiated inter-
mediate good fxj;tg
lt
j=0 as inputs. Production in this sector takes place under
perfect competition and the price of Qt is normalized to unity. We assume a
production function of the generalized CESform; see Spence (1976), Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982).
Ongoing growth of per capita incomes is facilitated through human capital
externalities à la Romer (1986) such that, in the aggregate, production is linear
in the capital stock and displays increasing returns to scale. The production







j;t d j; (6)
with 0 <a <1, A>0. ¯ Kt denotes the aggregate stock of capital, which the indi-
vidual rm takes as exogenously given and therefore neglects in optimization.
We identify each type of intermediate good employed in the production
of the nal good with one monopolistic producer in the intermediate goods
sector. Consequently the number of different types is identical with the popu-
lation share of entrepreneurs in the economically active generation. Additive
separability of (6) in intermediate goods ensures that the marginal product of
input j is independent of the quantity employed of j0 6= j. The intermediate
goods are close but not perfect substitutes in production, with the elasticity of
substitution between goods j and j0 given by ej;j0 = 1=(1 a).
The time t prot of the representative rm in the nal goods sector is given
by
Pt = Qt  rt Kt  
Z l
0
pj;t xj;t d j ; (7)
where pj denotes the price of intermediate good j. We further assume a con-
stant rate d of depreciation of physical capital over time, such that the interest
factor is given by Rt =1+rt  d. Optimization then yields the prot maximizing











wherewe also make use of the fact that in equilibrium Kt = ¯ Kt. The monopolistic
producer of intermediate good xj faces the isoelastic demand function (9), with
the direct price elasticity of demand given by e =   1
1 a.
Intermediate goods sector The intermediate goods sector is populated by a
large number lt of small rms, each producing a single variety j of a differ-
entiated good. The producers engage in monopolistic Bertrand competition.
Labor Lt is the single input of production. We assume that all the monopolists
of the intermediate sector produce according to the identical constant returns
to scale technology of the form
xj;t = qj;t Lj;t : (10)
Firms differ only with respect to the realization of the idiosyncratic (rm spe-
cic) productivity shock qj with density qj 2 Q  R++ : f(q), which is assumed
to be nondiversiable, uncorrelated across rms and lognormally distributed,
with mean E[lnq]= ¯ q and variance Var[lnq]=s2. Similar to Kanbur (1979b), we
posit that the entrepreneurs hire labor after the draw of nature has occurred.
This also implies that workers do not face a layoff risk. Recall that earlier we
assumed the costs of changing occupations to be prohibitively high, such that
agents are prevented from switching between groups in case of unfavorable
realizations of the shock.












The rm problem essentially is a static one. Under perfect competition on the
labor market, the producer treats the wage rate wt as exogenously given. Price





6The prot maximizing price of a typical entrepreneur in the intermediate goods
market is the markup 1=a > 1 over the marginal costs of production.
Using the demand function for intermediate good j given by equation (9),



















Labor market The labor market is characterized by perfect competition. The
equilibrium wage rate can then be derived upon equating the aggregate labor
supply with expected labor demand. If we take account of (14), the i. i. d.
property of the rmspecic technology shock and the characteristics of the



















The aggregate labor supply equals the population share of workers, Lt =1 lt,
due to the normalization of population size. Equating this expression with (15)
allows us to solve for the market clearing wage rate wt
















The equilibrium wage rate is a function of the yet undetermined population
shares of workers and entrepreneurs. Since we are dealing with a general
equilibrium model, each change in the number of rms simultaneously affects
aggregate labor supply and therefore the market clearing prices.
Given the equilibrium wage rate, it is now possible to derive a closedform






















2There is no aggregate risk by the law of large numbers. Note that the assumption stated
on the properties of the underlying distribution of shocks only refers to the subpopulation of
entrepreneurs measured by the share l of the entire population.
7We proceed with the determination of the equilibrium prot income of mo-



























The prot income of a typical producer j in the intermediate goods industry
also depends on the equilibrium distribution of agents over occupations. Ad-
ditionally, entrepreneurial incomes are positively related to the existing capital
stock and the realization of rmspecic technology shock.
Having so far derived the equilibrium values of individual incomes, we are
now able to determine the aggregate level of income Yt generated in the in-
termediate goods sector, which equals overall income of the young generation
being economically active in period t. It is given by the weighted average of
individual incomes



















Mean income in the intermediate goods sector also crucially depends on the
size of the population shares of workers and entrepreneurs. Irrespective of
the equilibrium outcome of occupational choice to be determined below, it is a
worthwhile question to ask, whether there exists an `optimal' population share
of rms yielding a maximum output level in this sector. Indeed we nd that the
fraction l = 1 a maximizes the aggregate income of the young generation.
3 A Redistributive TaxTransferScheme
As the productivity of the monopolistic rm is unknown at the time of decision,
agents deciding to become entrepreneurs face an income risk. The individuals
only possess information regarding the distributional properties of the produc-
tivity shocks. Consequently, we expect risk averse agents to show a certain
behavior of risk avoidance by already adapting to the uncertain environment
in advance.
In what follows, we assume that riskpooling arrangements, which perfectly
diversify the individual risk, are not available. The cause can, for instance, lie
8in credit market imperfections or problems of moral hazard. If instead full risk
sharing was possible ex ante, all individuals of the young generation would
receive the identical mean income Yt, as given by (19). This makes agents
identical on an a priori level. But then the problem arises that the model lacks
a selection mechanism allocating individuals among the two occupations and
simultaneously establishing the income maximizing number of rms l =1 a.
Hence, under the assumption of incomplete insurance markets, a redistribu-
tive public taxtransferscheme provides ex post at least a partial insurance
against the idiosyncratic income risk. Already Varian (1980) and Sinn (1996)
pointed out that the insurance effect of redistribution might positively affect the
individual inclination towards riskbearing. If we carry this argument over to
the present context, we expect a larger fraction of agents already ex ante choos-
ing the entrepreneurialprofession in the knowledge that part of the income risk
will be socialized afterwards.
In what follows, we introduce a nonlinear taxtransferscheme, which is
only imposed upon members of the young and economically active generation.
Members of the retired generation are neither taxed nor do they receive any
transfers, thereby making sure that the intertemporal allocation is not subject
to distortionary taxation. Government intervention serves the sole purpose of
redistributing market incomes earned in the intermediate goods sector. It maps
pretax incomes into post tax incomes, thereby providing at least some insurance
against the idiosyncratic productivity risks of entrepreneurs.
With yi;t denoting an agent's pretax income, his post tax income ˆ yi;t results
according to the following scheme, previously employed by Bénabou (1996,





Bt ; t  1 : (20)
Bt denotes a lumpsum transfer and can be interpreted a some kind of sub-
sistence income each agent receives. The progressivity of the redistributive
scheme is measured by the elasticity of posttax investment t. For t > 0, the
marginal rate rises with pretax income, for t < 0 the scheme is regressive. The
level of the transfer Bt is indirectly determined by the government's budget














t di : (21)
Figure 1 displays the redistributive scheme for the case of progressive taxation.









t net benet net burden
Figure 1: The redistributive taxtransferscheme
while those characterized by a low pretax income yi
t <B
1=t
t receive a net benet
from redistribution.
Equilibrium occupational choice An equilibrium distribution of households
over the two types of occupation is characterized by a situation, where for
a given redistributive tax transfer scheme, the marginal agent ex ante does not
benet from switching between occupations. This is tantamount to expected
lifetime utility of an entrepreneur being equal to the lifetime utility of a worker.
Since the equilibrium wage rate is safe, by substitution of (16) into lifetime
utility (5) and taking account of (20), the intertemporal welfare of a worker




. The expected lifetime utility of

















with (22) nally yields the equilibrium population









We nd 0 <l <1, hence (23) is an interior solution. The population shares are
constant in equilibrium and depend on the primitives of the model, that is the
10degree of risk aversion r, the variance of the technology shock s2, the elasticity
of substitution between two arbitrary intermediate goods j and j0, implicitly
measured by a, and nally, the degree of tax progression t.
From (23), we immediately obtain the following result regarding the re-
lationship between the equilibrium share of entrepreneurs and the extent of
redistribution:
Proposition 1 (Redistribution and entrepreneurship) The equilibrium share
of entrepreneursl is time invariant. It is decreasingin the degreeof risk aversion r
as well as in the variance of the productivity shock s2. The effect of redistribution
on the equilibrium share of entrepreneurs is ambiguous. l is increasing in t if
r > 1, decreasing in t if r < 1 and independent of t if r = 1.
Thus, whether or not the insurance effect accompanying a larger extent of
redistribution actually stimulates entrepreneurship crucially depends on the de-
gree of risk aversion, which we assumed to be uniform throughout the society.
This result originates from the fact that redistribution gives rise to two counter-
acting effects on the share of entrepreneurs l. The rst one is the direct effect
of redistribution. As already proposed by Varian (1980) and Sinn (1996), an
increase in t reduces the risk associated with posttax prots, thus encouraging
entrepreneurship. The second indirect one stems from the general equilibrium
nature of our model. A rise in the number of entrepreneurs is tantamount to a
decline in the populations share of workers, making labor more scarce and in-
ducing a rise in the marketclearing wage rate. From an ex ante viewpoint, the
safe profession becomes more attractive which establishes a negative incentive
towards rm ownership.
If the agents' attitude towards risk is sufciently low (i. e. r<1), the second
effect dominates the rst one, such that the number of rms decreases as t rises.
Extending the amount of redistribution promotes entrepreneurship only, if the
degree of risk aversion is sufciently large, that is r > 1.
4 Market Equilibrium and Steady State Growth
The market for intermediate goods is cleared, if aggregate demand for goods
xj;t equals aggregate supply. By utilizing equation (17), the equilibrium output
of the nal good can be derived as follows











11From the rstorder condition (8), we further get the market clearing rate
of return to physical capital rt as determined by marginal productivity theory.
Hence, the gross rate of interest can be derived as follows











The interest rate is constant for all t and also is a function of the equilibrium
share of entrepreneurs l.
Aggregate time t savings are undertaken by the members of the young gen-
eration, that is St =f[R(l)]Yt. Given (19), we therefore end up with the follow-
ing growth rate g of the economy












Apparently, the growth rate also crucially depends of the number of rms in
the intermediate goods sector. From this follows:
Proposition 2 (Entrepreneurship and economic growth) The growth rate of
the economy g is a nonmonotonic function of the equilibrium population share
of entrepreneurs. The growth rate is maximized if the fraction of rms equals
l = 1 a. It is is increasing in l for l < l and decreasing in l for l > l.
The equilibrium value for the share of entrepreneurs in the absence of any










A closer look at (27) reveals that, in a situation without public intervention,
the growth rate is suboptimally low, since lt=0 < 1 a for all r;s > 0 and
0 < a < 1. This results reects the risk avoiding behavior of risk averters, who
sacrice potential prots in favor of earning safe wage incomes. The fraction
of agents choosing the entrepreneurial profession is too small, compared e. g.
to a riskless environment.
Concerning the relationship between redistributive policies and longrun
growth, we can state the following:
Proposition 3 (Redistribution and economic growth) For r > 1, an increase
in the extent of redistribution as measured by a corresponding increase in t leads
12to a rise in the growth rate g of the economy. The growth rate declines with more
redistribution, if r > 1, while changes in redistributive policies leave the growth
rate of the economy unaffected, if r = 1.
Let us now rst consider the case of a society with a low degree of risk
aversion, such that r < 1. Starting from a situation without redistribution (i e.
t=0), the growth rate increases with a rising fraction of entrepreneurs. Accord-
ing to Proposition 1, this only achieved by means of implementing a regressive
taxtransferscheme, characterized by t<0. From equation (23) it follows that
the tax rate t associated with the growth maximizing share of entrepreneurs





If, instead, the society is characterized by a comparably high degree of
risk aversion, such that r > 1, a progressive taxtransferscheme fosters en-
trepreneurship and subsequently economic growth. Since the growth rate is
monotonically increasing in t, this implies that the greater the extent of redis-
tribution the larger the growth rate. However, contrary to the case of a com-
parably small risk aversion, no redistributive scheme exists, which supports
the growth maximizing number of rms. Even in the limiting case t ! 1 of
complete ex post redistribution of incomes, the growth rate of the economy is
smaller than the one associated with l = 1 a.
Moreover, a problem similar to the one already discussed above for perfect
ex ante riskpooling emerges. The agents know in advance that market incomes
will be perfectly redistributed afterwards. Hence, they are ex ante indifferent
between the two occupations. Since equating expected utilities does not work
in this case, the model again lacks a selection mechanism, allocating agents
among the professions. Any arbitrary population fraction of rms l 2 (0;1)
may result, which by no means necessarily has to be equal to l = 1 a.
Finally notice that, unlike in deterministic models of endogenous growth,
maximization of the growth rate of the economy and maximization of welfare
not necessarily coincide in case of stochastic growth models. The equilibrium
distribution of individuals among occupations resulting from utility maximiz-
ing behavior does not inevitably maximize the longrun growth rate of the
economy and subsequently overall income.
13Income distribution and welfare Our model yields straightforward results con-
cerningthe distributional consequencesof redistributive policies in the econom-
ically active generation. Income inequality unambiguously declines among the
members of the young generation as t rises.
Regarding the relationship between inequality, redistribution, and growth,
we nd that this is primarily governed by the mechanisms already described
in Proposition 3. Longrun growth in a society with a comparably low aver-
sion towards risk (i. e. r < 1) is positively affected by a decrease in the degree
of tax progression, which is accompanied by an increase in income inequal-
ity. Contrary, in a society of relatively strong risk averters (i. e. r > 1) growth
improvements are only achieved by means of a more progressive tax scheme,
thereby also yielding less income inequality.
If it comes to the welfare effects of changes in redistributive policies, these
can be evaluated by comparing the pure market equilibrium without public
intervention to the allocation resulting from the implementation of a specic
taxtransferscheme, if we additionally assume that in t = 0 the tax rate is
immediately effective and then remains constant over time for all t =0;1;:::;¥.
Let us now rst consider the effects occurring when the scal scheme gets
implementedin periodt =0. Due to the insuranceeffect of progressive taxation,
the net income of an agent born in t = 0 will increase. If the degree of risk
aversion in the society is comparably large (i. e. r > 1), the population share of
entrepreneurs will increase too. This raises output in the intermediate as well
as in the nal goods sector and will also increase the marginal productivity
of physical capital. A rise in the real interest rate then immediately carries
over to a larger longrun growth rate of the economy. Simultaneously, the
income of the currently old generation increases too, due to the rise in capital
returns. From this follows that the static as well as the dynamic effects of
a progressive taxtransferscheme are unambiguously positive, since not only
the young generation born in t = 0 as well as the currently old one benets
from redistribution. Additionally, all future generations experience an increase
in their expected lifetime utility. A larger extent of ex post redistribution in the
case of r > 1 induces positive welfare effects and therefore reects a Pareto
improvement, despite the fact that the degree of ex ante inequality becomes
larger.
From a welfare point of view, this result inevitably suggests perfect redis-
tribution to be the measure of choice, where the limiting case t ! 1 results in
14complete ex post equality of individual incomes. Again, this gives rise the prob-
lem of indeterminate occupational choice which we already described above. A
way out of this dilemma could be to take account of efciency costs of redistri-
bution which usually accompany public interventions into market outcomes. If
we also considered distortionary effects  for instance, within the laborleisure
choice  the determination of an optimal tax rate might as well yield an inte-
rior solution, weighing the costs against the benets from redistribution.3
Let us now switch to the case of a sufciently low degree of risk aversion in
the society, that is r < 1. Contrary to the high risk aversion scenario discussed
above, here, increases in the extent of redistribution can never yield Pareto
improvements. A rise in tax progressivity induces a decline in the population
share of entrepreneurs which is followed by a corresponding decline in the
output levels in both, the intermediate and the nal goods sector. The market
clearing wage rate falls as well as the equilibrium return to capital does, which
ultimately depresses longrun growth. If we sum up the associated welfare ef-
fects, we observe that, due to lower wages, lifetime utility of a worker declines.
Moreover members of the initially old generation are harmed too, due to the
income losses resulting from the decrease in capital return. The dynamic effects
of less growth also erode welfare of future generations.
This conclusion also holds for an arbitrarily chosen regressive taxtransfer
scheme (i. e. t < 0). Although growth and welfare effects relating to future
generations are generally positive in this case, the rst generation gets harmed
due to an increase in income inequality. This generation cannotbe compensated
by the future benets of regressive taxation. Hence a rise in the degree of tax
regression cannot be valued a Paretoimprovement.
The welfare results we derive in our model stand at odds to the conclu-
sions Garcia Peñalosa and Wen (2004) derive in a closely related framework.
They generally assume a comparably low degree of risk aversion (i. e. r < 1)
and demonstrate that Paretoimprovements are possible if certain conditions
are met. The differing outcomes can mainly be ascribed to the fact that Gar-
cia Peñalosa and Wen (2004) abstract from capital accumulation and therefore
do take account of welfare consequences for the currently old generation.
3At the moment our model neglects such distortions. A comparably easy way to introduce
efciency costs is to assume that the amount
R 1
0 ˆ y i
t to be redistributed by the government falls
short of the level of pretax income
R 1
0 yi
t by a factor k(t) which is increasing in the degree of
tax progression t.











Figure 2: Welfare and tax progression
Even if redistribution does not not always allow for Paretoimprovements
in their model, Garcia Peñalosa and Wen (2004) demonstrate by using a util-
itarian social welfare function and providing numerical simulations that the
welfare maximizing redistributive scheme at least is always characterized by
progressive taxation. Transferred to the context discussed here, overall welfare










; 0 < b < 1 : (28)
Assuming this utilitarian welfare measure, we are able to derive results similar
to Garcia Peñalosa and Wen (2004) for appropriate parameterizations of the
model.4 Figure 2 shows that the degree of tax progression maximizing the
discounted sum of expected utilities is positive.
5 Conclusions
This paper combined an OG twosector model of endogenous growth with the
issue of occupational choice under risk in order to analyze the effects of re-
distributive taxation on macroeconomic performance and welfare. It was mo-
tivated by empirical ndings indicating that, on the one hand, the attitude
4The parameters were set according to: a = 0:75, s2 = 0:1, ¯ q =  s2=2, A = 0:7, r = 0:5,
b = 0:95, b = 0:9 and d = 0:1.
16towards risk is a major determinant of entrepreneurship, while, on the other
hand, rm ownership is an important factor for longrun economic growth.
A central result of our analysis is that the individual prot risk has a detri-
mental effect on the equilibrium population share of entrepreneurs in the econ-
omy and is subsequently depressing the growth rate, if markets for pooling id-
iosyncratic risks are not available. This gives rise to the question, as to whether
redistributive policies might improve upon this situation, by providing an ex
post social insurance.
We were able to demonstrate that the argument, brought forward by Varian
(1980) or Sinn (1996) and more recently by Garcia Peñalosa and Wen (2004),
indicating that the prospect of ex post redistribution of income already improves
entrepreneurial risktaking in advance, is only valid, if certain conditions are
met. The agents' response to changes in the degree of tax progression is pri-
marily governed by the individual attitude towards risk. This result can partly
be ascribed to the general equilibrium nature of our approach. The positive
incentives towards risktaking stemming from the associated reduction in the
variability of prot incomes counteract negative incentives due to an increase
in overall wages, as labor supply decreases and the population share of rms
rises.
Moreover, we could show in this context that utility maximizing behavior
not necessarily also implies maximum growth. The social insurance which is ex
post provided by a redistributive taxtransferscheme is inferior to a perfect ex
ante risk pooling, in the sense that agents still have the incentive to avoid risk.
Consequently, the rate of rm ownership is suboptimal low if compared to its
growth and income maximizing value.
Up to now our theoretical analysis neglects two important factors also deter-
mining the interaction between entrepreneurship, taxation and growth. On the
one hand we did not take account of costly redistribution, such that progres-
sive taxation does not entail any efciency costs. On the other hand, the agents
of our model are not exposed to any kind of liquidity constraints concerning
capital formation. This stands in contrast to empirical evidence provided, for
instance, by Evans and Leighton (1989) or Blanchower and Oswald (1998),
who nd nancial constraints to play an important role in the decision as to
whether or not to start up a rm. This issue is devoted to future research.
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